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Eksisterende rammeverk for risikoanalyser ble utviklet for rundt 50 àr siden og baserer seg i stor
grad pa den forstàelsen man hadde den gang av uiykkesmodeller og hvordan uiykker skjer. Siden
den tid er flere alternative forstâeiser av spesielt storuiykker elier organisatoriske uiykker lansert.
Pr i dag har disse irnidlertid i stor grad det til felles at de ikke har utviklet gode metoder for a kunne
analysere risiko, men i hovedsak er begrenset til a kunne brukes i uiykkesgransking, for forkiare
ulykker som har skjedd.
I denne oppgaven er máiet a se pa prosesslekkasjer pa offshoreinstallasjoner med utgangspunkt i
FRAM-modellen (Functional Reasonance Accident Modelling). Fokus kan om nødvendig
avgrenses til lekkasjer som skyldes feil under arbeid pa trykksatt utstyr. Formálet er a danne seg en
oppfatning av om dette er en mulig alternativ fremgangsmâte, a gjøre seg opp en mening om
arbeidsomfang, om man far andre svar enn gjennom en tradisjonell risikoanalyse samt om
kvantifisering er mulig og hensiktsmessig. Dette vii danne grunniag for anbefalinger om videre
arbeid.
Oppgaven skal gjennomføres i følgende trinn:
1. Litteraturstudium — gjennomgang og oppsummering av relevant litteratur om FRAM samt
sette seg inn i problemstillingen.
2. Etabiere en modell for prosessiekkasjer, basert pa FRAM. Modellen skal i utgangspunktet
vre kvalitativ, men malet er at den skal kunne danne grunniag for kvantifisering.
3. Identifisere databehov for en slik modell og vurdere tilgjengelighet av data sorn behøves for a
kunne kvantifisere risiko.
4. Vurdere modellen som er utviklet og arbeidet som er utfort med tanke pt:
a. Arbeidsomfang, sammenlignet med tradisj onelle analysemetoder
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b. Hvilke nye muligheter for beslutningsstøtte en slik model! gir sammenlignet med
tradisjonelle analysemetoder.
c. Om kvantifisering er mulig med en slik modell, og i sâ fall hvilke nye typer data som
ma fremskaffes for a kunne kvantifisere.
5. Oppsummere og gi anbefalinger for videre arbeid.
Oppgavelosningen skal basere seg pa eventuelle standarder og praktiske retningslinjer som
foreligger og anbefales. Dette skal skje i nert samarbeid med veiledere og fagansvarlig. For ovrig
skal det vre et aktivt samspill med veiledere.
Innen tre uker etter at oppgaveteksten er utlevert, skal det leveres en forstudierapport som skal
inneholde følgende:
• En analyse av oppgavens problemstillinger.
• En beskrivelse av de arbeidsoppgaver som skal gjennomfores for løsning av oppgaven.
Denne beskrivelsen skal munne ut i en klar definisjon av arbeidsoppgavenes innhold og
omfang.
• En tidsplan for fremdriften av prosjektet. Planen skal utformes som et Gantt-skjema med
angivelse av de enkelte arbeidsoppgavenes terminer, samt med angivelse av milepeler i
arbeidet.
Forstudierapporten er en del av oppgavebesvarelsen og skal innarbeides i denne. Det samme skal
senere fremdrifts- og avviksrapporter. Ved bedømmelsen av arbeidet legges det vekt pa at
gjennomføringen er godt dokumentert.
Besvarelsen redigeres mest mulig som en forskningsrapport med et sammendrag bade pa norsk og
engeisk, konklusjon, litteraturliste, innholdsfortegnelse etc. Ved utarbeidelsen av teksten skal
kandidaten legge vekt pa a gjore teksten oversiktlig og velskrevet. Med henblikk pa lesning av
besvarelsen er det viktig at de nødvendige henvisninger for korresponderende steder i tekst, tabeller
og figurer anføres pa begge steder. Ved bedommelsen legges det stor vekt pa at resultatene er
grundig bearbeidet, at de oppstilles tabellarisk og/eller grafisk pa en oversiktlig mate og diskuteres
utførlig.
Materiell som er utviklet i forbindelse med oppgaven, sâ sorn programvare eller fysisk utstyr er en
del av besvarelsen. Dokumentasjon for korrekt bruk av dette skal sâ langt som mulig ogsà vedlegges
besvarelsen.
Eventuelle reiseutgifter, kopierings- og telefonutgifler ma bere av studenten selv med mindre andre
avtaler foreligger.
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“Knowledge has to be improved, challenged, and increased constantly, or it vanishes.”
Peter F. Drucker

Preface
This report is written by stud.techn. Inger Krohn Halseth and constitutes the master thesis
“Modeling process leaks using FRAM”, given at the Department of Production and Qual-
ity Engineering at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU). The mas-
ter thesis has its foundation in the project assignment “Monitoring of Major Accident risk -
Leaks and Fires”. The work related to the thesis has been performed from January to June of
2012.
A lot of guidance and feedback through the entire process of writing this assignment has
been given by my supervisor professor Stein Haugen, and for that I am truly grateful. I would
also like to thank Ivonne Herrera for a helpful conversation on FRAM, and my sister Anja
Halseth for making my thesis better and always cheering me on.
Trondheim, 07.06.2012
Inger Krohn Halseth
i
ii
Summary
This thesis was written to form an understanding of whether the Functional Resonance Anal-
ysis Method (FRAM) is a possible alternative approach to review process leaks on offshore
installations and gain some experience on the amount of work involved, whether there are
different results compared to conventional methods and if quantification is possible and
suitable. To answer this a literature survey was performed, resulting in an explanation of
the course of the method. After this, the method was tested on an exemplified operation on
pressurized equipment. These results were in turn used to evaluate the method in terms of
workload, quantification and the characteristics of the method.
FRAM, when used to analyse risk, contrary to retrospect when considering accidents, con-
sists of four steps. First the system or operation considered is divided into functions. For
each function six parameters are defined; input, output, preconditions, resources, time and
control. The next step consists of characterizing the potential variabilities of the function,
namely the variation of possible performances of a function. In the third step the network
is constructed using the defined parameters. The parameters link the functions together be-
fore the variations is traced throughout the system identifying functional resonance, this is
called following a signal. In the last step barriers for variability are identified, in addition,
performance monitoring may also be specified.
The method was tested on a description of an operation taken from the studies of Barrier
and Operabiilty Risk Analysis (BORA) where pressurized equipment is closed down to disas-
semble some equipment. In this case a pump is removed from a separation system. After
performing the analysis it was found that the process had several barriers and opportunities
for dampening the Disassembly function, which is critical in terms of leakages. The other
functions critical in terms of leakages, the functions involved in closing down and isolat-
ing the system, does not have the same layer of protection. The source of the signal creat-
ing resonance in these functions is often found in the functions Draw up work description
and Coordination with CCR, it is therefore natural to direct new barriers towards these func-
tions.
The results of testing the method on this system has shown that FRAM is a suitable method
for modeling the cause of process leakages. The method provides the analysts with the tools
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to ask the right questions before looking for the answers. The methods lack of assumptions
of typical cause-effect relations and decomposition of the system into components opens up
for the analysts to see new aspects and connections that might have been overlooked when
using more traditional methods.
One of the methods greater disadvantages is that it is, compared to more traditional meth-
ods, time consuming. Some of this time can be attributed to the fact that the method is new
and requires the user to get accustomed to the method and a new way of thinking. Since the
method requires a team effort, this may make the apparent difficulty appear larger. Another
element that may add time to the analysis is the lack of a detailed step by step approach por-
traying how to perform the analysis, which more common and established methods have.
The method is extensive, it is important that the constraints and limitations are thoroughly
defined and the focus of the analysis well specified and understood. In lack of this, the net-
work would become very large and difficult to handle and it would be easy to miss a possible
outcome of a signal. This also applies to the functions, if they are defined covering too much
it would be difficult defining the variability and handling this throughout the system.
FRAM is developed as a qualitative method, and for the time being there are no established
steps formulated for the method to support quantification. Since the method focuses on
the likelihood of function variability rather than the probability of a malfunction or failure,
a quantification would require some changes to handle this. It should be possible to math-
ematically construct the network connections and their variability, the problem is finding
good functions representing the variability, in other words data. A possible solution that
would not require altering the method as it is today is adding an additional step using the
results found when examining the resonance within the network. By doing this the data
needed would only be on the variability known to create unwanted events, instead of all the
defined variability. A natural method to use would be an event tree, this is however a linear
method and some simplification might be necessary when considering each path of reso-
nance pursued in the quantification. Several event trees might be needed to quantify all the
different scenarios and data on both technical, organizational and human variations must
be documented.
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Sammendrag
Denne oppgaven ble skrevet for å undersøke om Functional Resonance Analysis Method
(FRAM) er en egnet metode for å se på presselekkasjer på offshoreinstallasjoner. Ved å gjøre
dette har en forsøkt å danne seg et overblikk over arbeidet involvert i en slik metode, de
ulike resultatene en slik metode kan tilby i forhold til konvensjonelle metoder samt å vurdere
mulighetene for kvantifisering. For å besvare dette ble et litteraturstudium utført, presentert
som en stegvis forklaring av metoden. Etter dette ble metoden testet på en eksemplifisert
operasjon på trykksatt utstyr. Resultatene fra dette ble igjen brukt til å evaluere metoden i
form av arbeidsomfang, kvantifisering og egenskapene til metoden.
FRAM, når den brukes til å analysere risiko i motsetning til analyse av ulykker, består av fire
trinn. Først blir systemet eller operasjonen som er under analyse delt inn i funksjoner. For
hver funksjon defineres seks parametere; input, output, forutsetninger, ressurser, tid og kon-
troll. Det neste trinnet består av å karakterisere den potensielle variabiliteten i funksjonene.
I det tredje trinnet blir nettverket konstruert ved hjelp av de definerte parameterne. Disse
danner koblingspunktene mellom funksjonene før den definerte variasjonen spores gjen-
nom systemet for å identifisere funksjonell resonans, dette kalles å følge et signal. I det
siste trinnet blir barrierer for å forhindre variasjonen identifisert, i tillegg kan også overvåk-
ingsmuligheter spesifiseres.
Metoden ble testet på en beskrivelse av en operasjon tatt fra en studie av barriere og op-
erasjonell risikoanalyse (BORA) der et trykksatt system blir stengt ned for å demontere ut-
styr. I dette tilfellet blir en pumpe fjernet fra et separasjonssystem. Etter å ha utført analysen
ble det funnet at prosessen hadde flere muligheter for å dempe signaler sendt til funksjonen
Demontering, som er kritisk i forhold til lekkasjer. De andre funksjonene kritiske i forhold til
lekkasjer, funksjonene som er involvert i nedstenging og isolering av systemet, har ikke det
samme laget av beskyttelse. Kilden til signalene som kan skape resonans i disse funksjonene
er ofte funnet i funksjonene Utarbeide arbeidsbeskrivelse eller Samordning med sentralt kon-
trollrom, det er derfor naturlig å rette nye barrierer mot disse funksjonene.
Resultatene fra testing av metoden har vist at FRAM er en egnet metode for modellering
av prosesslekkasjer. Metoden gir analytikerne de nødvendige verktøyene som trengs for
å stille de riktige spørsmålene før de leter etter svar. Metoden er ikke basert på typiske
v
årsak-virkning-relasjoner og systemet brytes ikke ned i komponenter, slik mer tradisjonelle
metoder gjør. Dette åpner for å se nye aspekter og sammenhenger som kan ha blitt oversett
ved bruk av mer tradisjonelle metoder.
En av metodens svakheter er at den, sammenlignet med mer tradisjonelle metoder, er tid-
krevende. Noe av denne tiden kan tilskrives det faktum at metoden er ny og krever at bruk-
eren gjør seg kjent med metoden og den nye måten å tenke på. Siden metoden krever et
team, kan dette gjøre at disse utfordringene oppleves større. Et annet element som kan
øke tidsbruken er analysens mangel på en detaljert forklaring av fremgangsmåten, noe mer
etablerte metoder har. Metoden er omfattende, det er derfor viktig at restriksjoner og begren-
sninger er grundig definert og at fokuset for analysen er godt spesifisert og forstått. I mangel
av dette vil nettverket bli svært stort og vanskelig å håndtere, og det vil med dette være lett å
overse et mulig utfall av et signal. Dette gjelder også ved utforming av funksjonene, hvis de
er definert slik at de dekker for mye vil det være vanskelig å definere variabilitet og håndtere
dette i hele systemet.
FRAM er utviklet som en kvalitativ metode, og for tiden er den ikke utformet slik at den støt-
ter kvantifisering. Siden metoden fokuserer på sannsynligheten for variasjon i funksjonene
snarere enn sannsynligheten for feil eller svikt, ville en kvantifisering kreve noen endringer
for å håndtere dette. Det bør være mulig å matematisk konstruere nettverkstilkoblingene og
deres variabilitet, problemet er å finne gode funksjoner som representerer variasjon, med
andre ord data. En mulig løsning som ikke ville kreve endring av metoden slik den er i dag er
å legge til et ekstra steg i analysen der resultatene funnet når nettverket analyseres for reso-
nans blir brukt videre for å kvantifisere. Ved å gjøre dette vil den nødvendige dataen kun være
på variabiliteten kjent for å skape uønskede hendelser, istedenfor alle definerte variabiliteter.
En mulig metode å bruke ville være hendelsestrær, dette er midlertidig en lineær metode og
noe forenkling kan være nødvendig når man vurderer hvert tilfelle av resonans. Det kan være
behov for å konstruere flere hendelses trær for å kvantifisere alle de ulike senarioene og data
om både teknisk, organisatorisk og menneskelige variasjoner må fremskaffes.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
The existing framework for risk analysis was developed about 50 years ago and is mainly
based on the perception of how accidents happened and of accident models at that time.
Later, several alternative interpretations of particularly major accidents and organizational
accidents have been launched. As of today, these understandings have in common that no
accompanying methods to perform risk assessment have been developed; generally they
are limited to accident investigation and to explain why accidents have happened. New
methods including organizational aspects and non-linear relations have been developed,
but there is still room for much improvement. The Functional Resonance Analysis Method
is one of the new methods focusing on the relations between different functions in the sys-
tem, and by mapping these, describing outcomes using the idea of resonance arising from
the variability of everyday performance.
1.2 Problem formulation
The general problem to be addressed as it was presented in the master thesis assignment
consists of five main tasks, as listed below:
1. Literature survey – review and summarize relevant literature on FRAM and become
familiar with the assignment.
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2. Establish a model for process leaks, based on FRAM. The model will initially be quali-
tative, but the goal is that it shall form the basis for a quantitative model.
3. Identify the parameters needed for such a model and assess the availability of the data
needed to quantify the risk.
4. Assess the model developed and the work performed in terms of:
(a) The amount of work, compared to conventional methods of analysis.
(b) Determine new possibilities of decision support given by such a model compared
with conventional methods of analysis.
(c) Determine if quantification is possible given such a model, and if so, the new
types of data required to do so.
5. Summarize, conclude and give recommendations for further work.
1.3 Objective
The objective of the assignment is to form an understanding of whether the Functional Res-
onance Analysis Method is a possible alternative approach to analyse process leaks on off-
shore installations, gain some experience on the amount of work involved, whether there
are different results compared to conventional methods and if quantification is possible and
suitable.
1.4 Scope and Limitations
1.4.1 Scope
The term “mainly” will be used to indicate that the main discussion covering the task is in
the stated section or sections.
Task 1; Literature survey. The aim of this task is to gain enough knowledge of the method
to perform the analysis. The findings from this task will create the foundation for the entire
report, particularly task 2. This task will mainly be covered in chapter 3.
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Task 2; Establish a model. The aim of this task is to perform a FRAM analysis for process
leaks with the possibility of quantification at a later stage. This is the task that will require
the most time and resources in the thesis. The task will mainly be covered in chapter 4, 5 and
6.
Task 3; Evaluate quantification The aim of this task is to identify the required data to en-
able quantification. This task, and subtask c) in task four are overlapping. These tasks are so
correlated that they are considered as one and are mainly answered in section 7.1.
Task 4; Evaluate the model. The aim of this task is to evaluate the method in terms of work-
load, decision support and possible quantification. The task is manly answered in chapter 7.
Each subtask is devoted its own section, respectively section 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3 but arguments
and discussion on the topics related to the subtasks can be found exceeding these through-
out the chapter.
Task 5; Summarize. The aim of this task is to give a summary of the findings and recom-
mendations for further work, this will to some degree be done in chapter 7, but the answer
to this task will manly be found in chapter 8, constituting the conclusion of the thesis.
1.4.2 Limitations
The focus of the analysis is limited to leaks caused by errors during operations on equipment
under pressure. Leaks can occur during many different processes on the platform for equip-
ment under pressure. To test the method, a general maintenance operation on pressurized
offshore equipment is used as an example to test and illustrate the FRAM analysis in relation
to process leaks. Several parts of the steps in the method is usually done in teams with op-
erational expertise, knowledge and experience with the process in question. In lack of this,
an assessment is done based on the information provided in the process description in this
thesis, with the weaknesses this entails.
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1.5 Approach
This master thesis is a sequel to the project assignment. The project assignment was mainly
performed as a literature study with an aim of clarifying how different perspectives are used
to understand accidents and how they happen, methods to monitor accident risk and what
methods are used in terms of leaks and fires.
The first part of the thesis will consist of a small literature survey where articles applying the
FRAM method and other material describing the method will be used to give a short step by
step presentation of the method. The database on www.functionalresonance.com displaying
all relevant publications on FRAM has been diligently used to find articles and information
on the topic. Based on the findings the method is applied to an exemplified operation from
the process industry. According to Reisman (1988) the scientific method used in this thesis
can be described as a transfer of technology, where a known method is used in a new context.
FRAM has to this date mostly been applied in aviation studies in addition to nuclear industry
and the health industry, the transfer in technology is quite small, but there are no records of
the method being used in analysis of operations in the process industry. The last part of
the thesis will consist of a discussion of the findings done when applying the method with
regards to quantification, the data needed and new possibilities of decision support given by
the method.
Chapter 2
Definitions and abbrivations
2.1 Definitions
Barrier - a hindrance that may either prevent an unwanted event from taking place, or pro-
tect against the consequences (Hollnagel, 2004).
Failure - termination of the ability of an item to perform a required function (NS-EN 13306,
2010).
Functional Resonance Analysis Method - refers to the analysis as a whole.
Functional Resonance Analysis Model - refers to the model constructed by connecting the
defined functions i.e. the network.
Hazard - source of potential harm (SN-ISO Guide 73, 2009).
Non-linear interactions - a nonlinear system is any problem where the variable(s) to be
solved for cannot be written as a linear combination of independent components (Wikipedia,
2012).
Resilience - the ability to meet risk (Herrera et al., 2010).
Risk - effect of uncertainty on objectives (ISO 31000, 2009).
Safety - freedom from those conditions that can cause death, injury, occupational illness,
damage to or loss of equipment or property, or damage to the environment (MIL-STD-
882D, 2000).
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Socio-technical system - is loosely referring to a system with interactions between society’s
complex infrastructures including both technological, organizational and human be-
havior.
Sub-system - is loosely referring to a part of a system which itself has the characteristics of
a system, usually consisting of several components.
2.2 Abbreviations
AC form - Activity and Control form
BORA - Barrier and Operability analysis
CCR - Central Control Room
CPC - Common Performance Conditions
CREAM - The cognitive reliability and error analysis method
FRAM - Functional Resonance Analysis Model/Method, see definitions
HC - Hydro Carbons
HAZOP - Hazard and Operability study
HEART - Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique
MTO - Human,Technological and Organizational
NCS - Norwegian Continental Shelf
O&M - Operations and Maintenance
PSA - Petroleum Safety Authority
P&ID - Piping and Instrumentation Diagram
QRA - Quantitative Risk Analysis
QA - Quality Assessment
RE - Resilience engineering
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RNNP - Risk level in the Norwegian petroleum industry (from Norwegian, Risikonivå i Norsk
Petroleumsindustri)
SJA - Safe Job Analysis
SOP - Standard Operating Procedure
STAMP - System-Theoretic Accident Model and Process
THERP - Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction
TRA - Total Risk Analysis
V&B - Valves and Blindings
WO - Work Order
WP - Work Permit
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Chapter 3
Functional Resonance Analysis Method
Resilience Engineering (RE) introduces a new concept of viewing risk by taking the focus
away from viewing risk only as a reduction or elimination of negative outcomes, but instead
focusing on what goes right and with this, producing safety. RE views safety as the ability
to succeed under continuous changes in the system and its conditions (Herrera et al., 2010).
The term Resilience is defined as the ability to meet risk. It is the system’s ability to main-
tain operations before, during and after changes and disturbances in relation to known and
unknown conditions. In this chapter the Functional Resonance Analysis Method will be pre-
sented, this is a method based on principles from RE.
3.1 FRAM
FRAM is a functional method in the meaning that it focuses on normal variability in the
system and considers variations in the execution of daily operations (Herrera et al., 2010). It
is a risk model reviewing non-linear interactions of a sosio-technical system and it is built
on reviewing normal operations, when things are working as they should be. By describing
operations when they are functioning, this can also be used to understand why things go
wrong. The method is based on four principles (Hollnagel et al., 2008):
1. The principle of equivalence of successes and failures. This is related to the princi-
ple from RE grounded in the view that failures represent the flip side of the adoptions
necessary to cope with the real word complexity rather than a failure of normal system
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function. Success is measured in the ability of an organization, group or individual to
anticipate the risk and critical situations, to recognize them in time and to make ap-
propriate action. Failure is a result of temporary or permanent absence of this ability.
2. The principle of approximate adjustment. The conditions of work never completely
match what has been specified or prescribed, adjustments must always be made to
succeed with the actual resources and requirements at hand. Because the resources
always are finite, such adjustments are invariably approximate rather than exact.
3. The principle of emergence. This reflects how variability in normal performance rarely
is large enough to cause an accident on its own, but how variabilities from multiple
functions may combine in unexpected ways, leading to consequences that are dispro-
portionately large, hence produce a non-linear effect.
4. The principle of functional resonance. The variability of a number of functions may at
some occasion reinforce each other and thereby cause the variability of one function to
exceed its normal limits. The consequence may spread through tight couplings rather
than via identifiable and enumerable cause-effect links.
3.2 FRAM – Step by step
There are some different opinions to how many steps there are in a FRAM analysis, though
the majority consider it to be four, there are those who include an initiating step where the
goal of the analysis is defined. This concerning whether the analysis is done as part of a risk
analysis or as part of an accident investigation (in retrospect or prospect). The difference in
performing a FRAM in retrospect or prospect is little, the only difference is the focus of the
analysis, therefore the initiating step is not included.
3.2.1 Step 1; Identifying functions
In order to map the event or scenarios that are under analysis the essential system functions
are identified and described. A function is, in terms of FRAM, defined as an activity or a task
that is important or necessary for the state of other task or activities (Herrera et al., 2010).
Hollnagel (2005) describe each function through six different parameters, these are:
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1. Input (I) – What the function uses or transforms, this constitute the links to previous
functions.
2. Output (O) – What the function produces, this constitutes the links to the subsequent
functions.
3. Preconditions (P) – Conditions that must be fulfilled before a function can be per-
formed. This can for example be that another step or process has been completed or
that a specific system condition has been established.
4. Resources (R) – What is needed by the function to process the input, this can for ex-
ample be procedures, software, hardware, energy, manpower etc.
5. Time (T) – That affects time availability of the function. Hollnagel (2005) explains this
by determening that everything takes place in time and is governed by time. It can also
be a constraint in the sense of a time window for an activity (a duration) or it can be
considered as a special kind of resource.
6. Control (C) – That supervises or adjusts the function. This can be active functions or
just plans, procedures and guidelines.
These six aspects of a FRAM function are visualized using a hexagonal representation shown
in figure 3.1. These will in a later step be connected together through the parameters defined
in this step.
Figure 3.1: Visualization of the six parameters and the FRAM function (Wolter and Hollnagel, 2008).
Macchi (2010) proposes that functions identified in the analysis are classified as either fore-
ground or background functions. The foreground activities are defined as the main focus
of the analysis, for example control functions. The background functions are the functions
that provide support and means (i.e inputs, controls, resources and preconditions) for the
performance of the set of foreground functions. The systemic approach adopted by the
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FRAM therefore requires that both foreground and background functions are modeled with
the same approach.
3.2.2 Step 2; Identifying variation
In this step the potential variabilities of the functions are characterized. By asking the ques-
tions; Which conditions can lead to increased performance variability? Which functions are
affected? And how can the variability express itself and how may this affect/be affected by
other functions? The variability of the functions are tried deduced.
Step 2 is a good illustration of FRAM being a new method still under development. The
original tool suggested used to ease this process was the common performance conditions
(CPCs) and variability phenotypes (Nouvel and Travadel, 2007). In this case eleven CPC are
identified within FRAM to elicit potential variability. The CPCs address the combined hu-
man, technological and organizational (MTO) aspects of each function (Wolter and Holl-
nagel, 2008). The CPC are used as the main determinant of the variability of the functions,
the combined effect of the CPC are non-linear. The variability can be characterized in a qual-
itative manner or by using equivalent concepts such as stability, predictability, sufficiency
and boundaries of performance (Wolter and Hollnagel, 2008). The human/machine failure
modes that are related to FRAM can be used to characterize the potential consequences of
functional variability in terms of quality of the output. This can be expressed either as failure
modes, or variably phenotypes.
A more recent method suggested to replace the old method to characterize the variability, is
to asses the function in relation to the three MTO categories: HuMan (M), Technology (T),
and Organization (O) (Macchi, 2010). These three categories describe functions of a different
nature and with characteristic differences in performance variability.
• Human factors will, because people must adjust their performance to the current work-
ing conditions, typically be quite variable. They can vary on a short term basis, but may
also have a dampening effect.
• Technological functions that to a large degree depend on the technology implemented
in the system are in less subject to variability since they are designed to be stable re-
liable and predictable, but they do not have the ability to dampen performance vari-
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ability.
• Organizational functions have a variability relative to the human functions. The na-
ture of organizational functions have a delayed effect on the human functions. A typ-
ical example of this is the production and updating of procedures. The organizational
functions are typically a set of background functions.
Hollnagel (2005) illustrates how the CPCs can be classified according to the MTO principle.
This is shown in table 3.1. As seen in this table most of the CPC affect the human functions,
this creating the most variability. By using the MTO categories and resources with knowledge
of the situation, the variability of the method is identified.
Common Performance Conditions
Functions affected
M T O
Availability of resources x x
Training and experience (competence) x
Quality of communication x x
HMI and operational support x
Access to procedures and methods x
Conditions of work x x
Number of goals and conflict resolution x x
Available time / time pressure x x
Circadian rhythm, stress x
Crew collaboration quality x
Quality and support of organization x
Table 3.1: MTO relation to CPC (Hollnagel, 2005).
3.2.3 Step 3; Constructing the network and identifying functional reso-
nance
Simultaneous occurrences of spreading variability may have the effect of resonance, it be-
comes a signal that spreads throughout the system, it is this phenomenon that may con-
stitute a high risk or vulnerability (Woltjer, 2012). In this step the functional resonance is
defined based on the possible couplings between functions and the potential functional
variability. The functions defined in step one, may be coupled via their parameters. One
functions output may be another functions input, fulfill a precondition, or enforce a con-
trol or time constraint. The couplings are found by analyzing the functions and identifying
common aspects. By combining these links with the results from step 2 the variability of one
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Figure 3.2: A FRAM instantiation for landing on a helicopter deck during night (Herrera et al., 2010, p.
133).
function and how this may spread through the system is mapped. The connections between
the functions are modeled using the hexagonal representation of the functions and drawing
a line between the parameters to illustrate the link between the parameters of each function
to each other, as shown in figure 3.2.
The acronym FRAM is used for both Functional Resonance Analysis Model and Functional
Resonance Analysis Method without any clear distinction between these two concepts. In
this thesis the use of method refers to the analysis as a whole while the use of model refers to
the model constructed by the functions i.e. the network.
3.2.4 Step 4; Identifying barriers
In the last step barriers for variability are identified, in addition required performance mon-
itoring may also be specified (Nouvel and Travadel, 2007). Hollnagel (2004) defines a bar-
rier as a hindrance that may either prevent an unwanted event from taking place, or protect
against the consequences. In FRAM four categories of barrier systems are identified these
are; physical, functional, symbolic or incorporeal. A physical barrier, or a material barrier,
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physically prevent an action from being carried out or an event from taking place (Hollnagel,
2004). A characteristic of the physical barrier is that they do not have to be perceived or in-
terpreted by the acting agent in order to work, this is not the case for the functional barrier.
This type of barrier requires a pre-condition to be met before action can be carried out, a
good example of this is a lock that requires either a password or a key. A symbolic barrier
has the characteristic that they require an act of interpretation in order to achieve its pur-
pose. Examples of such a barrier is the reflective posts in the road indicating the edge of the
road and the speed limit. A procedure represent a symbolic barrier system since its warns,
cautions and conditions require an act of interpretation to work, but can also be seen as an
incorporeal barrier. Incorporeal barriers are not material but depend on the knowledge of
the user in order to achieve its purpose. Examples of incorporeal barriers are for example
rules, guidelines, safety principles, restrictions and laws.
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Chapter 4
Defining the process
The RNNP project monitors the risk level on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) as a
whole, the project was initiated by the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, now the Petroleum
safety Authority (PSA) in 2000 (PSA, 2010). The goal of the project is to monitor and identify
the risk level in the Norwegian petroleum industry. Annual reports are published describ-
ing the development and based on this the PSA identify areas that need extra attention. In
the eight year period 2001-2009, 350 leaks occurred. In the reports from 2004 it was found
that along with serious well incidents, damage to supporting structures and marine systems,
and ships on a collision course, such leaks occurred for more than 80% of total major acci-
dent risk on the NCS. Process leaks is in other words a phenomenon that should be moni-
tored closely and better methods to do this and anticipate when they will occur are always
wanted. To test FRAM a general scenario of operations on pressurized equipment taken
from the BORA studies is used as the basis when performing the analysis. In this chapter
the system under analysis is presented, broken down into functions and the parameters are
defined.
4.1 The situation considered
The situation considered for analysis in this paper is an event where a pump is removed for
maintenance from a separation system. The Piping and Instrumentation Diagram (P&ID)
in figure 4.1 shows how such a system may look like. When operations are carried out on
pressurized equipment several procedures and checklists must be followed. Planning, au-
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thorization , checklists and briefing meetings must be executed, an example of how this may
be done is found in the table given in appendix A, taken from the BORA studies. Here the
work description is given, in addition to the people needed for the task, the demands and
possible faults. The procedures described in this table forms the basis used for identifying
the FRAM functions. The operation can in short be described as planning the process, clos-
ing and draining the system before the pump is disconnected. When this pump is repaired it
is connected to the system followed by O2-emptying and testing before the system is turned
back on.
Figure 4.1: P&ID of the system.
4.2 Identifying functions
The first step in FRAM is to identify the functions of the operation in analysis. A more or
less chronological list of the function is shown in appendix B.1.2, the numbers following
the functions refers to the steps in the process description in appendix A, describing the
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operation in more detail.
4.2.1 Simplifications
From appendix B.1.2 one can see that 33 functions are identified to describe the operation.
To simplify and make the workload more fitting for the next tasks, only the functions up
to and including Disassembly are considered. The assumption that the operation can be
performed by one shift is also made, excluding the handover between shift as part of the
analysis. Defining the functions, parameters and variability for each function is usually done
in teams with operational expertise, knowledge and experience with the process in question,
but in lack of this, an assessment is done based on the information provided in the process
description in this thesis, with the weaknesses this entails.
4.2.2 Foreground functions
The identification and choice of the overall functionality or performance that will be the fo-
cus of the analysis is what states the foreground of the analysis. Since the activity in analysis
is leaks in a pressurized system it is natural to consider the activities that directly can lead to
a leak as the focus of the analysis. The foreground functions defined for the operation can be
found in table 4.1. The full sett of foreground functions for the entire operations considered
can be found in appendix B.1.2.
Foreground functions
Prepare for work (16-18)
Shut down process (19)
Isolate using valves (20)
Drain (21-23)
Isolate (24)
Disconnect equipment (25, 26)
Disconnect safety system (38)
Disassembly (43)
Table 4.1: Foreground functions.
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4.2.3 Background functions
The identification of background functions is based on the consistency check of the model
and starts from the description of foreground functions. The background functions pro-
vide support and means for the performance of the set of foreground functions. The iden-
tified background functions for the part of the operation considered are found in table 4.2,
the classification of the background functions for the entire operation can be found in ap-
pendix B.1.2.
Background functions
Draw up work description (1-12):
Draw up work permit (13-14)
Coordinate with Central Control Room (CCR) (15)
Label equipment. (27-29)
Prepare (30-32)
Quality check and sign Work Permit (WP) (33-35)
Sign splice log (39)
Update (Valves and Blindings) V&B (40)
Supervision; ignition control ( 41 )
Quality control (42)
Table 4.2: Background functions.
4.3 Parameters
For each of the defined functions up to and including Disassembly the six different parame-
ters have been identified. Table 4.3 shows and example of the parameters identified for the
foreground function Drain, parameters identified for the full set of functions are found in
appendix C.
FRAM function Drain
Input Work Order (WO) , WP, marked P&ID
Output Empty piping and equipment
Time
Control Standard Operating Procedure (SOP)
Preconditions Draining to closed system
Resources Area technician, N2/steam
Table 4.3: Parameters for the foreground function Drain.
Chapter 5
Function variabilities and connections
One of FRAMs four principles is the principle of Approximate Adjustments which states that
situations and conditions never are identical, and adjustments are made to fit the actual
conditions. This creates variability. In this chapter the variability for each of the systems
defined functions is identified and the FRAM network is constructed.
5.1 Variabilities
Defining the variability of the functions is done by first classifying the functions according to
the MTO principle. The MTO categories relate to different CPCs, the original classification
used to identify variability in FRAM. How the variation is seen will differ for the different
CPCs, in the same way human, technological and organizational variability will differ in its
characteristics. In table 5.1 it is shown how Macchi (2010) explain how the MTO categories
have different variability and ability to damp the effect of the variability.
Human Technological Organizational
Characteristic
performance
Adjust their perfor-
mance to current work-
ing conditions
Function in a stable,
reliable and predictable
way
Provide support and
means to human and
technological functions
Variability Variable (High fre-
quency)
Stable, slowly degrading Variable (High inertia)
Damping
potential
Potential for perfor-
mance variability
damping
No potential for perfor-
mance variability damp-
ing
Provide the means to
damp performance vari-
ability
Table 5.1: Performance variability and their qualities in relation to MTO (Macchi, 2010, p. 69).
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5.1.1 MTO classification
When classifying the functions according to the MTO principle, each function is considered
and its nature is identified. It is possible for a function to be classified in more than one
category, a manual procedure involving use of technical equipment will be considered both
human and technical. An example of this is the function Shut down process. This involves
the operator interpreting the information giving the order to shut down the system, then per-
forming this command in the control room causing the technical equipment to shut down.
In the same way the function Draw up work permit includes the manual operation of pro-
ducing the work permit and the organizational task of getting it approved by all the necessary
levels in the organization.
Function M T O
Draw up work description (1-12) x
Draw up work permit (13-14) x x
Coordinate with CCR (15) x
Prepare for work (16-18) x
Shut down process (19) x x
Isolate using valves (20) x x
Drain (21-23) x x
Isolate (24) x
Disconnect eq. (25, 26) x x
Label eq (27-29) x
Prepare (30-32) x x
Quality check and sign WP (33-35) x x
Disconnect safety system (38) x x
Sign splice log (39) x
Update V&B (40) x
Supervision; ignition control (41) x
Quality control x
Disassembly (43) x
Table 5.2: MTO classification of process functions.
The result of classifying the function according to the MTO principle can be found in ta-
ble 5.2. As indicated by the great majority of the functions being classified as human, one
can from Macchi’s (2010) classification of the different variability expect a variability with a
high frequency but also a potential for performance variability damping.
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5.1.2 Defining the variability
The next step is to identify each of the functions’ variability. By using the MTO classification
and asking the questions 1-3, the variability of the functions is tried identified.
1. Which conditions can lead to increased performance variability?
2. Which functions are affected?
3. How can the variability express itself and how may this affect/be affected by other
functions?
As mentioned in section 4.2.1, defining the variability for each function is usually done in
teams with operational expertise and knowledge of the process in question, but in lack of
this, an assessment is done based on the information provided in the process description in
this thesis, with the weaknesses this entails. When identifying the variability of each func-
tion, the entire function and what the function entails is considered, this being reflected in
the MTO classification, and the questions 1-3 are answered. In lack of a team and more ex-
perience and knowledge of the process the different CPCs related to the MTO classifications,
found in table 3.1, are used as a supplement when identifying conditions that can lead to
increased performance variability.
Each of the functions identifed variability can be found in appendix C. Here the questions
1-3 are answered. If there are any special circumstances or other information relevant for
the variability this will be found in an additional row in the table labeled “Comment”. An
example of this presentation is found in table 5.3, where the parameters and variability of
the function Drain is shown. In the row describing the control of the function, many of the
functions have only the notation SOP written, this refers to Standard Operating Procedure,
indicating that there are no known extra measures of control in addition to the operator(s)
need to follow preapproved procedures.
5.2 Constructing the network
The work done to construct the network is mostly done when the variability and parameters
are defined. The question which functions are affected lists all the functions succeeding the
function in question. With this and the defined parameters, the connections between the
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FRAM function Drain
Input WO, WP, marked P&ID
Output Empty piping and equipment
Time
Control SOP
Preconditions Draining to closed system
Resources Area technician, N2/steam
Variability
1. Competence, stress, communication, degradation, work condi-
tions
2. Isolation
3. Wrong valves opened, inadequate draining, inadequate proce-
dures, no flushing, inadequate gas freeing
Table 5.3: Variability and parameters for the function Drain.
functions are already identified and the network can easily be drawn. In this thesis a plug-in
stencil for Microsoft Visio is used (Woltjer, nd). The result can be found in figure 5.1. The
foreground functions are identified using a darker color.
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Figure 5.1: The FRAM model for process leaks.
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Chapter 6
Identifying functional resonance and
barriers
Resilience engineering and the FRAM method is founded on a view that accidents result
from unexpected combinations, also known as resonance of normal performance variabil-
ity. The resonance is a detectable signal that emerges from the unintended interaction of
the variabilities of many functions that together may combine in unexpected ways, leading
to consequences that are disproportionally large. In this chapter the last step in the FRAM
method is performed; identifying the functional resonance in the FRAM model. In addition,
a small discussion of the possible barriers to prevent the resonance is included.
6.1 Identifying functional resonance
Identifying the resonance is done by considering the variations defined in the previous chap-
ter and following the possible outcomes of this throughout the network, combining the vari-
ations of the different functions to identify all the possible outcomes. An example of how
this process is done is described below.
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6.1.1 Example of tracking a signal in the network
The example will track a signal and how this may lead to a leak throughout the network.
Starting with a signal created in the function Draw up work description. This function has a
variability affected by stress and workload, this may result in a wrong notation of information
regarding valves, pumps, seal, pressure etc. Assuming a wrong notation of the equipment in
the process is done, this signal is tracked throughout the network. Each function when con-
sidered in relation to the signal will be listed with one or more numbers in brackets. These
numbers represent the number of activities passed from the initiating variation starting the
signal to the event in consideration. For example will the function Coordinate with CCR have
both the numbers 1 and 2, denoted (1;2), seeing as its both in direct connection to the start-
ing point in Draw up work description but also connected via the function Draw up work
permit, making it a secondary connection. The connection can be through any of the pa-
rameters, not only input/output.
Draw up work permit (1) For this function communication and knowledge are the con-
tributors to variability. Communication can be inadequate and a failure to detect the signal
occurs. But it can also go the other way and the signal is detected due to good communica-
tion and knowledge of the process and thus working as a damping effect.
Coordinate with CCR (1;2) For this function inadequacies in communication and knowl-
edge may lead to the signal going unnoticed or it may work as a dampening effect and the
error is found and corrected. Additional errors increasing the signal can be made by not see-
ing overlapping processes creating problems as a result of the information on equipment
involved in the operation being incorrect.
Prepare for work (1;2) This functions’ variability is affected by stress and competence. If
knowledge of the system is good the signal may be dampened or the preparations may be
inadequate seeing as the information provided is incorrect.
Shut down process (3;3) In this function experience and knowledge may lead to a damp-
ening effect causing the signal to be detected, otherwise the signal will continue into the
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network.
Isolate using valves (2;4) For this function the signal can result in the system not being
isolated seeing as the wrong equipment is operated, degradation may worsen this effect, or
the signal could be discovered and dampened. If not, the signal will go unseen and the wrong
valves may be shut down.
Drain (3;5) In this function the signal may lead to the system not draining properly or at all
caused by the misinformation regarding equipment in the signal. Another possible scenario
is draining to the wrong system, as a result of closing the wrong valves. This may result in
leakages or disturbances outside the system covered in this analysis.
Isolate (2;4;6) For this function drain is a precondition, if drain is not completed this can
result in a leak. Another possibility is that the signal is not spotted and the wrong blindings
are isolated, which again may lead to the isolation not fulfilling its function as a barrier.
As seen in figure 6.1 the signal spreads from Draw up work description and ends up with a
leak, illustrated by a drop of oil in the output of the function Drain. Another feature seen
by this illustration is how there are several paths to the different functions. The function
Isolate have both a direct path with only one function between itself and the starting point,
and a longer path covering six functions. This will result in more opportunities for making
mistakes, but also provide several opportunities for dampening the effect. The signal can be
followed throughout the entire system with many different other scenarios, describing this
entire process is too time and space consuming and the findings will in stead by summarized
in the paragraphs below, both in terms of resonance and dampening effects.
6.1.2 Resonance
By viewing resonance and how this will spread throughout the system with emphasis on
leakages it is apparent that the function Drain is critical, a leak cannot occur unless there
is liquid in the system, therefore any variations leading to the drain function not being fully
completed are dangerous in terms of leakages. Another critical point in the process is isola-
tion, more specifically the functions Isolation and Isolation using valves. If these processes
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Figure 6.1: Illustration of how a signal may spread in the system until a leak occurs.
6.1. IDENTIFYING FUNCTIONAL RESONANCE 31
are disturbed in a matter causing the barriers to be vulnerable, the possibility of a leak in-
creases. This will manifest itself in either the functions Disconnect equipment or Disassem-
bly.
The focus of the analysis is leakages, the undesirable events will appear in the sharp end of
the system, which to a large degree are the foreground functions. The signal causing a leak-
age is however not necessarily started in the foreground functions. Studying the network
and how the signal spreads it is clear that the background functions Draw up work descrip-
tion and Coordinate with CCR are the functions constituting the biggest risk of starting a
signal, with the possibility of affecting the other functions in such a way that a leak may be
the result. A foreground function with much the same ability is the function Prepare for work.
If there is much variation in this function a signal may be started and manifest itself in the
critical functions mentioned above.
If one or more of the functions mentioned above starts a signal, resulting in the wrong valves
being shut down in the function Isolate using valves, this might lead to draining to the wrong
system. This can result in problems in other processes on the plant which are not covered in
this analysis.
Following the signal it is clear that not all the functions included in the network will con-
tribute to a scenario involving a leakage, but merely pass the signal on without increasing it
any further. The reason for this is that there are many functions that only include updating
lists and documenting procedures, and not changing them. An example of this are the func-
tions Update V&B and Sign splice log. It is possible that the variation in these function might
cause trouble in the assembly of the equipment, but this part of the process was excluded
when the limitations were set, and is therefore not considered.
6.1.3 Dampening
Many of the functions have little effect on the signal in terms of the function being able to
create resonance that may lead to a leak. Instead they serve as an opportunity to discover
the signal and with that, the opportunity to dampen it. If dampening does not occur they
simply pass the signal “as is” to the latter functions in the network. The functions that in the
largest degree serve to this opportunity are:
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• Ignition control
• Quality check and sign WP
• Quality control
• Label equipment
• Sign splice log
• Update V&B
These functions must be passed as a mandatory devious route to get to the functions which
are more critical in terms of creating leakages, giving the system several opportunities to spot
its defaults before they turn into hazardous situations, and by doing this the devious routes
functions as a quality check.
It is not given that the functions with a larger potential for creating resonance can not cre-
ate dampening. In the functions where resonance may occur it is also a possibility that the
signals are discovered before an unwanted event occurs. An example of this is if a wrong
notation is made in the P&IDs in the function Draw up work description, the function Coor-
dinate with CCR can instead of making the wrong decisions based on this, detect the signal
and correct the error. In the example of tracking a signal the different numbers of activities
passed are listed for each activity, as one can see from this there are three different paths to
the function Isolate, giving several opportunities to dampen the signal.
6.2 Identifying Barriers
A barrier can either prevent an unwanted event from taking place, or protect against the
consequences. In the system considered there are several functions that serve as a barrier.
The function Disconnect equipment is a physical barrier preventing work accidents by elim-
inating the possibility of the equipment starting up at the wrong time. This is not a barrier
with main focus on leakages, but there are several of these. The function Ignition control is
a functional barrier set up to protect against the consequences if there is a leak in terms of
hindering it igniting. Quality Control is a function where a Safe Job Analysis (SJA), work place
control and approval is performed before the work permit is signed, this is a series of proce-
dures and can therefore be seen as a symbolic or incorporeal barrier according to Hollnagel’s
classifications. Other functions that consists of procedures that must be carried out are Sign
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splice log, Update V&B and the function Quality Control where the flange is controlled to be
the right one and it is ensured that the system is emptied of HC.
In figure 6.2 the functions with barrier purposes are marked in red and the output is followed
into the system. As one can see from this figure the only function determined as critical in
section 6.1.2 properly protected by these functions is Disassembly, leaving the other critical
functions Isolation, Drain and Disconnecting equipment unprotected. It is therefore natural
that if new barriers are recommend that they are centered towards these functions. Seeing as
the Draw up work description and Coordination of CCR are the functions that can create the
most trouble for these functions, it is natural to direct the barriers towards these functions.
A function reviewing and quality proofing the procedures to be performed is a good solution
for a barrier for these functions, seeing as the signal often is based on misinformation etc. In
terms of barriers this would be a physical or functional barrier that can stop a signal created
in these functions.
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Figure 6.2: Illustration of how quality control is centered around Disassembly and Disconnecting
safety system.
Chapter 7
Evaluation of the method
In this chapter the possibility of quantification will be discussed before the workload in
FRAM is considered. Then the strengths and weaknesses are discussed before some general
comments are made.
7.1 Quantification
FRAM is developed as a quantitative method, and for the time being there are no established
steps formulated for the method to support quantification. There are however some obsta-
cles, making the usefulness of applying the method as means to quantify scenarios ques-
tionable. One of the four principles FRAM is founded on is the principle of emergence. This
reflects how the variability of normal performance rarely is large enough to be the cause
of an accident, but how variabilities from multiple functions may combine in unexpected
ways, leading to consequences that are disproportionately large. Since the method focuses
on the likelihood of function variability rather than the probability of a malfunction or fail-
ure, a quantification would require some changes to handle this. If the cost of the changes
are considered worth while, a quantification is very possible, but the quality and accuracy
of it might be questionable, since the nature of the network makes it hard to determine the
uncertainty in addition to the difficulties of finding good data.
It should be possible to mathematically construct the network connections and their vari-
ability, the problem is finding good functions representing the variability, in other words
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data. The formula would be complex and hard to handle because the model is non-linear.
A possible solution that would not require altering the method as it is today is adding an
additional step using the results found when examining the resonance within the network.
By only using the results found to create resonance that may result in undesirable outcomes
and quantifying these, a lot of the trouble of tackling non-linearity and multiple outcomes is
avoided. A natural method to use would be an event tree, this is however a linear method and
some simplification might be necessary when considering each path of resonance pursued
in the quantification.
An example of how such an event tree would look is shown in figure 7.1. This is based on the
example of tracking the signal described in section 6.1.1, where the signal is a wrong notation
in a P&ID with the possible outcome of isolating with flanges in the wrong place. Using this
method, several event trees must be constructed to include all the possible chain of events.
An example of this can be seen in the function Coordinate with CCR which can find or pass
on the signal, or increase it by making decisions based on the wrong information worsening
the situation, which in turn can combine in different ways with the latter functions. Both
outcomes may result in a leak, but the path to the leak is different. This path, and other paths,
would be modeled in another tree. The frequency of leakages is found by calculating the sum
of each tree’s contribution to the probability of a leak. Using this method it is important that
the constraint and limitations are thoroughly set and the focus of the analysis well specified
and understood, so the undesired event does not cover to much which would result in large
amount of event trees to cover the quantification.
7.1.1 Data
The main obstacle in procuring data for quantifying FRAM is that the method focus on the
likelihood of function variability rather than the probability of a malfunction or failure. In
most risk analysis the data needed is either probability of success or failure, but in FRAM it is
the variability that must be quantified, in other words all possible performances of a function
and the distribution of these. By doing this, only the probability of a function varying in a
specified way must be quantified. Even with this simplification, finding good data is always
a challenge when doing risk analysis.
The probability of equipment failing or malfunctioning is data often given by the supplier
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Figure 7.1: Eventtree of FRAM results.
or it can be found by using historical data, the bigger challenge often lies in finding good
data for human and organizational failures. Here, a solution could be to borrow some tech-
niques from human reliability assessment methods and organizational factors in risk analy-
sis. Human reliability analysis were developed to provide input to quantitative risk analysis
and to integrate human factors into risk analysis. The distinct similarity between classical
human reliability analysis and FRAM is how these methods strive to identify performance
shaping factors and how these will affect the system. One of the most resent methods in
the field, CREAM (The cognitive reliability and error analysis method), also uses common
performance shaping factors (CPCs). Another example of finding the data could be using
the generic tasks and associated error probabilities from the Human Error Assessment and
Reduction Technique (HEART) developed by Jermey Williams (Reason, 1997). This method
classifies generic tasks in nine groups that range from totally unfamiliar, performed at speed
with no idea of likely consequence to miscellaneous task for which no description can be
found. For these groups the nominal error probabilities with 5th to 95th percentile bounds
are given. If these classifications are used, a challenge here will be breaking down the func-
tions small enough for this to be applicable.
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7.2 Workload in FRAM
Performing a FRAM analysis is a difficult and time consuming process, much of the time
used can however be related to the fact that FRAM is a new method, this requires the user
to get accustomed to a new way of thinking and will require extra effort. In addition, the
method is based on team work, meaning there are several people who need to get acquainted
with the method which can make the apparent difficulties of the method appear larger.
The method is still not finished, it is still under development and weaknesses are still be-
ing worked out and adjusted. With the lack of a detailed step by step explanation of how the
method is applied, which more established and tested methods have, it is natural that the
method will aquire more time. With more knowledge and experience in using the method it
is expected that it will go a lot faster.
Compared to conventional methods such as event trees and fault trees, FRAM is a very time
consuming method and it requires more resources. But the extra effort also provides a differ-
ent output, which can be argued to be of a richer nature. An event or fault tree only considers
the connections and dependencies defined (or imagined possible) by the applicant and is
performed to quantify these, while using FRAM new connections and dependencies might
be discovered. In terms of the output and resources FRAM has more similarities to a hazard
and operability study (HAZOP). A HAZOP is a structured and systematic examination of a
planned or existing process or operation in order to identify and evaluate problems that may
represent a risk. This method, like FRAM, uses teams with knowledge of the method and
the system considered and the output is knowledge of how the system may react in certain
situations.
7.3 New possibilities of decision support
One of FRAMs greatest strengths is that it provides a good understanding of how the system
works. By breaking down the system into functions and seeing how these will affect each
other instead of braking it down to components that are considered in solitude with regards
to their characteristics, the trap of finding a solution to each cause is avoided and the em-
phasis is made on providing a more comprehensive view of the interactions and the system
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as a whole.
FRAM does not include assumptions about specific or typical cause-effect relations, but in-
stead starts with a clean sheet and requires the analysts to identify these. The analysis helps
the team ask the right questions before looking for answers, this opens up for the analysts
to see new aspects and connections that might have been overlooked when using more tra-
ditional methods. In contrast, one of the most used and applied cause-effect relation is the
energy and barrier principle which is limited by its view of accidents being caused by uncon-
trolled energy and layers of protection failing to handle this.
The analysis is not limited to any specific performance or activity, and can be used to model
any kind of performance or activity. Already it has been used on “typical” topics from a risk
analysis perspective such aviation and nuclear activities. But it has also been used in analysis
of a local post office and in the handling of pharmaceuticals in pharmacies.
Imagination is another of the methods great strengths. The construction of the method
opens for possibilities and if imagination is used it can give results that otherwise would
be unconsidered, limited by automation of the method. The analysis guide the users instead
of automating it. By not restraining the thinking to use specified guide words or pre-defined
methodology to find the variation and resonance (as HAZOP does), the limitations of think-
ing are not reduced and provides the analysis with clues as to where to look, but not the
answers.
7.4 Limitations and troubles encountered
One of the biggest challenges with the method is, as already mentioned, that it is still quite
new and no complete description of the approach exists. The method is also dependent on
a team, and as most people who have ever worked in a team knows, teamwork can add great
value with several heads thinking better than one, but teamwork is time consuming and the
apparent difficulty of FRAM may appear larger in teams.
The methods lack of a definite step by step approach was especially difficult to handle when
defining the variability of the functions, since few examples with any detail of how to strate-
gically perform this were found. In most articles describing the use of FRAM, only the results
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are presented. In addition, the method first used to define variability when FRAM was cre-
ated, using CPCs, has been replaced by a new method, leaving much of the early examples
of uses of FRAM outdated. Some of this difficulty can also be attributed to the fact that de-
scribing the variation is based on expert judgment and that there is no right answer, this will
always create uncertainty.
When performing a FRAM analysis it is essential to have good knowledge and experience
with the process under analysis. The analysis performed in this thesis was done with no
hands on knowledge of the process, in addition to no team, this naturally set its limits to the
results. A good FRAM analysis is dependent on good knowledge of the process and all the
different possible variations of performance. Without personal experience in the process
the different “quick fixes” and nuances performed to handle variation in the functions is
therefore difficult to know of. The signal followed is therefore limited to the imagination and
mostly result in following errors and how they may resonance throughout the system.
Imagination is mentioned as one of the methods strengths, but it can also function as a re-
straint. Without the ability to free oneself from thinking of only right and wrongs and trying
to think out of the box to find new connections and ways of the signal to spread the analysis
will end up with a poor result. The analysis is constructed in such a way that it will guide
the analyst to where to look for answers, but the analysts are the ones who must conjure the
answers. A good FRAM is therefore much relient on good analysts.
The FRAM network can easily become very big, and with this, difficult to handle. There is
no strategic way of following a signal throughout the system, and if the network is large with
many connections throughout, it is easy to miss a connection and with that, a possibility of
resonance can go unnoticed. To handle this it is therefore important to limit the system and
functions making the system more manageable. Another obstacle concerning the size of the
network and functions was to break the functions down to small enough sub-processes. If
the function is “too big” there will be many contributors to the variation and quantification
of this will be extensive, making it more likely to miss one.
It is likely to think that the introduction of foreground and background functions was made
to handle some of the difficulty of having a big network. However, the experience from test-
ing the method in this thesis the definition of foreground and background gave little con-
tribution in the handling of the network other than making the focal point of the network
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easier to notice once it was constructed.
When the functions are identified they are described through the six different parameters;
input, output, precondition, resources, time and control, which also functions as the con-
nection between the functions as one functions output can be another functions input, pre-
condition etc. Some uncertainties between the differences of some of these parameters were
experienced. The parameter precondition is defined as the conditions that must be fulfilled
before a function can be performed. The parameter resources is defined by what is needed
by the function to process the input, this can for example be procedures, software, hardware,
energy, manpower etc., while the parameter input is what the function uses or transforms.
When the work description is written marked P&IDs and information on pressure in the sys-
tem is one of the outputs, this information is needed in the function Isolate using valves. If
this function does not have this information the function can not be performed, but does it
qualify as something needed to process the input, a condition that must be fulfilled to per-
form the process, or as what the function transforms? There is little problem in finding argu-
ments for this information to fit all of these three parameters. This created some confusion,
but since no problems were encountered as a result of functions being connected with either
one of the parameters, the conclusion was made that the important aspect is to clearly con-
sider what affects and concerns the function and to understand the dependencies between
the functions. As long as this is understood and considered, the choice of parameter used
will not affect the result of the analysis noticeable.
7.5 FRAM in relation to STAMP
The history of risk assessment started with the simple linear models focusing on technology,
before human factors were included, followed by organizational factors. New methods are
developed as new needs are identified an the old methods prove insufficient. FRAM is a new
method, but in no way revolutionary and is inspired by many other methods, here some
similarities to System-Theoretic Accident Model and Process (STAMP) are presented.
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7.5.1 STAMP
The System-Theoretic Accident Model and Process, views safety as a control problem (Leve-
son, 2004). The model is based on the believes that to prevent accidents, systems need to
be controlled so that no system constraint is violated. Instead of thinking in terms of events,
STAMP uses constraints as its very basic concept. A hierarchy of control based on adaptive
feedback mechanisms, called loops, is constructed to map the behavior of the system and
the constraints set to handle this behavior. The system is broken down into several loops,
each controlling a phase, action or subprocess in the system. STAMP considers the follow-
ing system components: hardware, software, people, technical organizational, societal and
organizational structures, engineering activities and dynamic factors in modern complex
systems. Instead of focusing on certain system components, STAMP analyzes those compo-
nents in terms of their interactions to each other (Setiadi, 2012).
Aceptable variation
FRAM
Variaton
STAMP
Figure 7.2: Illustration of the difference in handling variability in STAMP vs FRAM.
Much like FRAM, STAMP models the system as non-linear function where the system is bro-
ken down to smaller parts and a model of the system is constructed based on the interac-
tions of the different subprocesses defined. The parameters of each system are different;
FRAM classifies input, output, time, control, precondition and resources for each subpro-
cess, called functions in FRAM, while the parameters for STAMP are the controller, the acti-
vator and the sensors. Both methods constructs a model to identify how the different sub-
systems may affect each other and how this may result in unwanted events. Both methods
also consider the variability and strive to handle this, but how they handle it is somewhat
different. STAMPs focus is set on what may go wrong and how to stop this while FRAM, as a
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method based on RE, focuses more on understanding the system and how a failure occurs,
and by doing this increasing the ability to respond to disturbances and irregular and regular
threats, and the ability to flexibly monitor whats going on. An illustration of this difference is
made, seen in figure 7.2. The figure shows how the variation is reduced using STAMP while
the limits of acceptable variation are moved using FRAM.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions and further work
8.1 Conclusions
This thesis set out to determine if the Functional Resonance Analysis Method was a suitable
model for analysis of process leakages. The method was tested on a description of an oper-
ation taken from the BORA studies where pressurized equipment is closed down to remove
equipment. In this case a pump is removed from a separation system. The results of testing
the method on this system has shown that FRAM is a suitable method for modeling the cause
of process leakages. The method gives the analysts the possibility of gaining greater knowl-
edge of the system. One of the great advantages of the method, that separates it from more
traditional methods, is its lack of assumptions of typical cause-effect relations and decom-
position of the system into components. This opens up for the analysts to see new aspects
and connections. This advantage is reinforced by the methods ability to provide the tools for
the analysts to ask the right questions before looking for the answers.
The method does, however, have some weaknesses. The method, compared to traditional
methods, is time consuming and requires a team effort. Some of the time can be related to
the fact that the method is new, this requires the user to get accustomed to the method and a
new way of thinking. The fact that FRAM requires a team, may make this apparent difficulty
appear larger. The lack of a detailed step by step approach portraying how to perform the
analysis does not exist, which can create some confusion and add time to the method. The
method is very thorough. When using it, it is important that the constraint and limitations
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are thoroughly set and the focus of the analysis well specified and understood, so the unde-
sired event does not cover too much which would result in a large network. If the network
becomes large it will be difficult to handle. There is no strategic way of following the signal
throughout the system, and covering all possibilities can be difficult. This is also important
when defining the functions. If the functions cover too much, defining the variability and
handling this becomes difficult.
FRAM is developed as a quantitative method, and for the time being there are no established
steps formulated for the method to support quantification. Since the method focuses on
the likelihood of function variability rather than the probability of a malfunction or failure,
a quantification would require some changes to handle this. It should be possible to math-
ematically construct the network connections and their variability, the problem is finding
good functions representing the variability, in other words data. A possible solution that
would not require altering the method as it is today is adding an additional step using the
results found when examining the resonance within the network. A natural method to use
would be an event tree, this is however a linear method and some simplification might be
necessary when considering each path of resonance pursued in the quantification. By doing
this, the data needed would be on the variability known to create unwanted events. Several
event trees might be needed to quantify all the different scenarios and data on both techni-
cal, organizational and human variations must be documented.
8.2 Recommendations for further work
FRAM has to this date mostly been applied in aviation studies in addition to nuclear industry
and the health industry. The results of this thesis indicate that FRAM is a method suited for
process leakages. It would be interesting to test the method on a real system and see if the
result will give the workers better understanding of the system and if this again can reduce
the leak probabilities. Testing the method on a physical system will also open the possibility
of seeing if the quantification provides useful results that coincide with the experience of
leakages in the system.
Appendix A
The process in detail
In this appenix the description of the operation taken from the BORA studies is listed.
Work description Executor Demands Possible Faults
Planning
1 Receives Work Order
(WO)
Planner Piping and Instru-
mentation Diagram
(P&ID) + Aactivity
and control form
(AC-form)
2 Draw up work de-
scription
Planner
3 Requisite resources,
materials etc. after
need
Planner
4 Draw up plan for
shutdown/start-up
Area-/ operator man-
ager
5 Draw up valves and
blindings -package
(V&B)
Planner V&B drawn up based
on WR0218
V&B- list not drawn
up, V&B-list is wrong
6 Split point marked in
the P&ID
Operations system
manager
All connections
mounted/demounted
must be marked in
the P&ID
Split position not
noted, Wrong split
position noted
7 Draw up V&B list V&B must include a
V&B-list
V&B list not drawn up,
V&B list is wrong
8 Valve position
marked in P&ID
Valve position de-
scribed and marked
in P&ID
Valve position not
noted, Wrong valve
position noted
9 Mark blindings on
P&ID
Area-/ operator man-
ager
Blindings described
and marked in P&ID
Blinding not noted,
Wrong blinding noted
10 Draw up AC-form Planner Moment values for
flange assembly, type
of seal and relevant
tool info included in
the AC-form
AC-form not drawn
up Wrong seal type
specified, Wrong
pump pressure spec-
ified, Wrong moment
specified
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11 Identify and mark
common barriers
Common barriers
should be marked
with ref. to V&B-
package and be iden-
tified with orange
rectangular labels
Common barriers not
marked
12 Control and sign V&B
package
Area-/ operator man-
ager
Independent QA
on the plans with
the (Operations and
maintenance (O&M)
operator
(Quality Assurance)
QA not performed,
Fault in V&B package
not identified
13 Draw up Work Permit
(WP), level 1
Planner WP must be at level 1 WP not drawn up, In-
adequate WP
14 Pre-approval of WP Area-/operations
manager, 1st man-
ager, Platform man-
ager
WP at level 1 must be
approved by: Manger
(onshore) and area
manager or the per-
son in place of the
area manager. The
WP must be treated
at the onshore daily
meeting before coor-
dination of WP and
other simultaneous
activities
WP not pre-approved
15 Coordinating with
(Centeral Control
Room) CCR and other
activities
Area-/ operations
manager, CCR
Inadequate coordina-
tion, No coordination
Preparing equipment/system
16 Provide the necessary
tools, etc.
Technician The person responsi-
ble for the execution
is also responsible for
the provision of nec-
essary equipment for
splitting and assem-
bly, lifting tools and
jigs, tools for flange
assembly and lubrica-
tion
Hydraulic tool not
calibrated
17 Finds the correct seal Technician The person responsi-
ble for the execution
must see too that the
right seal is available
Chooses the wrong
seal
18 Perform operation
and maintenance
preparation accord-
ing to the WP
Area technician Necessary operation-
and safety prepara-
tions must be done
according to the WP
and procedures
19 Process shut down CCR
20 Isolate equipment us-
ing shutdown valves
CCR / Area technician Isolate the equipment
by closing the speci-
fied shutdown valves
Closes the wrong
valves, Valve in wrong
position
21 Pressure release to
torch or other system
CCR Reduce the pressure
by ventilating to the
torch
Opens the wrong
valve
49
22 Drain fluid to closed
system (including all
low points and instru-
mental pipes)
Area technician Drain fluid to closed
system and drain all
low points/inst. Pipes
of oil/condensate too
closed system and
flush with N2 and/or
steam
No draining, Inad-
equate draining,
Contact with other
HC systems (valve
in wrong position/
opens wrong valve/
inadequate proce-
dures)
23 Freeing gas Area technician No gas freeing, Inade-
quate gas freeing
24 Isolation with blind-
ings
Area technician Requirements for
isolation: P<10 Barg:
closed and locked,
P> Barg: DB&B or
blinding
25 Lock/disconnect
valves
Area technician, In-
strument technician
Valves are locked
where this is neces-
sary
Valve not
locked/disconnected,
Inadequate locking
26 Disconnect pumps,
heat cables etc.
Electro El. equipment not
disconnected, Wrong
el. equipment dis-
connect
27 Label valves Area technician All unlabelled valves
should be marked in
the field. The need
of labelling tagged
valves in the field
is evaluated by the
operation system
manager. All valves
used for isolation
shall be durable,
clearly and unam-
biguously labeled
Valve not labelled,
Wrong valve labelled
28 Label blindings Area technician All blindings affected
in the field must be
labelled. All blindings
used for isolation
shall be durable,
clearly and unam-
biguously labeled
Blinding not labelled,
Wrong blinding la-
belled
29 Label flanges to be
split
Area technician,
Technician
All flanges shall be
labelled with WO nr
and P&ID nr as a min-
imum
Flange not labelled,
Wrong flange labelled
30 Sign WO form Area technician WO form not signed,
WO form singed with-
out the equipment
being prepared
31 Draw up SJA Area/ operation man-
ager, Area Technician,
CCR, Technician
Evaluate the need of a
SJA
SJA not performed,
Inadequate SJA, Inad-
equate involvement
32 Perform operation
and maintenance
preparations accord-
ing to the WP
Technician Technician must per-
form operations and
safety preparations
according to the WP
and procedures
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33 Work place control
and sign WP
Technician Perform control and
through sign confirm
that orders will be/
are done
Shortcomings not
found
34 Approve work loca-
tion and sign work
permit
Area technician Control work permit
35 Authorize WP (acti-
vate in SAP)
CCR CCR evaluates if the
work can be started
in relations to on-
going activities. The
authorization to start
is given by activating
the WP in SAP
36 Before work call/ re-
view WP
Area technician,
Technician
Check that one is on
the right equipment,
System manager
must control draining
and that the system
is pressure free, Ap-
proved WP must be in
the work location and
a review of this must
be done with the
personnel involved
before the work is
started.
37 Handover between
shifts
Requirements in rela-
tion to shift change.
Communication
and coordination
meeting held and
important decisions
documented. Re-
view of planned and
on-going activities
performed. Ensure
that the new shift gets
all information on
status
Inadequate commu-
nication
38 Disconnect safety
system
Area technician, CCR Disconnection of
safety system and dis-
connection/locking
of electric equipment
must be registered
on the WP form or
isolation document
Safety system not dis-
connected
39 Sign splice log Splice log not signed
40 Keep V&B-list in cen-
tral space
Updated V&Bs are
kept in central place
of the plant. Changes
in status in V&B
are continuously
reported in the V&B
41 Control of spark and
ignition sources
Inadequate control
of spark and ignition
sources
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Conduction of maintenance
42 Control that the
flange is the one in
question, and that the
system is emptied of
HC
Area technician,
Technician
Operational system
manager and techni-
cian should ensure
that WO is approved,
the flange in question
Is the correct one, that
isolation/binding is
performed correctly
and that there is no
pressure or HC left in
the system etc.
43 Disassembly of
flanges
Technician Work done on wrong
system, The system
opened still contains
pressure
44 Supervision of open-
ing flanges
Area technician Area tec. should be
present when split-
ting of HC systems is
performed. Work in
adjacent areas should
be stopped.
45 Sign AC-form Technician AC-form signed
46 Venting tank Production techni-
cian
Inadequate venting,
No venting
47 Gas measurement Area technician
48 Control of flanges,
seal surfaces and
tracks.
Technician Flanges, seal surfaces
and tracks are con-
trolled for injuries,
corrosion and wear.
Control that bolts
and nuts are the
right material and
tagged according to
specifications
Damages not discov-
ered on flanges, seal
surfaces or tracks.
49 Work performed ac-
cording to WO
Technician Work not performed
according to WO,
Wrong operation of
valves
50 Sign form for “work
performed”
Technician If the tank or drum
has been opened,
the form “internal
inspection” must be
filled out and ap-
proved before the
tank is closed.
51 Control seal, bolts
and tracks
Technician Control that the right
type of seal is used
and the quality of the
material
Wrong seal not dis-
covered, Damages on
bolts and tracks not
discovered
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52 Assembly of flanges Technician Skills required: - 3 day
course in flange as-
sembly, - Experience
with supervision, - >
1 yr since the last
course, if its more
than 1 yr since the last
course, an E-course
may be taken
Flange not assem-
bled, Preload to low,
Preload to high,
Askew assembly,
Bolts not locked,
Missing seal in flange,
Wrong seal in flange,
Damage on seal in
flange, Inadequate or
wrong lubrication of
metal gasket
53 Label assembled
flanges
Technician Old labelling is re-
moved and replaced
by a new tag on the
flange connection
with the WO nr. Mo-
ment, date, name and
sign.
Flange not labelled,
Flange wrong labelled
54 Fill inn AC form Technician The person responsi-
ble for the assembly
should fill inn and
sign the AC form
continuously as the
flanges are assem-
bled.
AC form not filled out,
AC form inadequately
filled out.
55 AC-form saved for a
week at minimum.
CCR The AC-form must be
saved for at least a
week after the system
is in operation
56 Clean work area Technician
57 Sign form “ check
out before return-
ing equipment after
completed work”
The responsible per-
son should fill in the
form
Form not filled in,
Form wrongly filled in
58 Perform final inspec-
tion, sign WP
Technician Technician should
perform a final in-
spection in the work
place and by signing
this confirm that the
workplace is cleaned
and secure
Wrong assembly not
discovered
59 Connect safety sys-
tem
CCR, Area technician CCR should perform
a reconnection with
disconnected safety
functions where this
is relevant and reg-
ister this in the WP
form
Safety system not
connected
60 Sign splice log CCR Splice log not signed
Resetting system and production start up
61 Removes blindings Technician Forgets to movie
blindings
62 Resetting valves Area technician Valves not reset
63 Removes labelling on
valves and blindings
Area technician All labels in the field
should be removed
Labels not removed
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64 O2-freeing Area technician O” must be removed
to achieve inert at-
mosphere before tank
or equipment is ready
for start up, N2 used
as flushing gas
O2 not removed,
Wrong valve operated
65 Leak test performed Area technician, CCR Leak testing should
always be performed
according to ap-
proved specifica-
tions/procedures
Leak test not per-
formed, Wrong
assembly not dis-
covered in leak test
(ex. Wrong seal used)
66 Connect hoses Area technician Requirements to
standard couplings,
labelling, inspection,
pressure testing
Use of un approved
hoses, Hose not cor-
rectly connected
67 Reset valves Area technician Valves not reset
68 Disconnect hoses Area technician Hoses not discon-
nected
69 Log possible leakages
in relation to the leak
test
CCR All leakages during
testing should be
logged in a separate
system
Leakages not logged
70 Unlock border valves Area technician, In-
strument technician
Valves unlocked be-
fore system is cleared,
Valve in wrong posi-
tion, Transmitters not
calibrated
72 Connect pumps, heat
exchangers etc.
Electrician Electric equipment
not connected
73 Open border valves Border valves not
opened
74 Remove labels on bor-
der valves
Labels must be re-
moved
Labels not removed,
Labels removed
without valve being
opened
75 Perform final control
and sign WP
Area technician The area technician
should perform the
final control on the
work place after the
work is done. By sign-
ing he/she confirms
that the work place
is acceptable, in ad-
dition to the tagging,
locks and equipment
being removed and is
ready for operation
Final control not per-
formed, Inadequacy
not discovered
76 Authorize work, sign
WP, complete SAP
CCR CCR will by signing,
confirm the comple-
tion of the work is au-
thorized by the CCR
Work authorized
without being com-
pleted, Work com-
pleted without being
authorized
77 Debriefing Debriefing not per-
formed
78 Start-up of normal
production
Area technician, CCR Start-up not accord-
ing to procedures.
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Appendix B
Defined FRAM functions for the process
B.1 All functions
In the list below all functions are presented in a more or less chronological order, the num-
ber(s) in brackets refers to the activity in the process description found in Appendix A.
1. Draw up work description (1-12):
2. Draw up work permit (13-14)
3. Coordinate with CCR (15)
4. Prepare for work (16-18)
5. Shut down process (19)
6. Isolate using valves (20)
7. Drain (21-23)
8. Isolate (24)
9. Disconnect equipment (25, 26)
10. Label equipment (27-29)
11. Prepare (30-32)
12. Quality check and sign WP (33-35)
13. Disconnect safety system (38)
14. Sign splice log (39)
15. Update V&B (40)
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16. Supervision; ignition control ( 41 )
17. Quality control; empty of HC and the flange in question (42)
18. Disassembly (43)
19. Supervision; of opening (44)
20. Status updating; Sign AC form (45)
21. Repairing pump (46-50)
22. Assembly of flanges (51-52)
23. Label assembled flange (53-54)
24. Clean area (56, 57)
25. Final inspection (58)
26. Connect safety system (59)
27. Sign splice log (60)
28. Reset system (61-62)
29. Remove labels; valves and blindings (63)
30. Testing (64-66)
31. Resetting equipment (67, 71, 72, 73)
32. Remove labels; border valves (74)
33. Final control (75-78)
B.1.1 Foreground functions
The following functions are defined as foreground functions:
• Prepare for work (16-18)
• Shut down process (19)
• Isolate using valves (20)
• Drain (21-23)
• Isolate (24)
• Disconnect equipment (25, 26)
• Disconnect safety system (38)
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• Disassembly (43)
• Repairing pump (46-50)
• Assembly of flanges (51-52)
• Connect safety system (59)
• Reset system (61-62)
• Testing (64-66)
• Resetting equipment (67, 71, 72, 73)
B.1.2 Background functions
The following functions are defined as background functions:
• Draw up work description (1-12):
• Draw up work permit (13-14)
• Coordinate with CCR (15)
• Label equipment (27-29)
• Prepare (30-32)
• Quality check and sign WP (33-35)
• Sign splice log (39)
• Update V&B (40)
• Supervision; ignition control (41)
• Quality control; empty of HC and the flange in question (42)
• Supervision; of opening (44)
• Status updating; Sign AC form (45)
• Label assembled flange (53-54)
• Clean area (56, 57)
• Final inspection (58)
• Sign splice log (60)
• Remove labels; valves and blindings (63)
• Remove labels; border valves (74)
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• Final control (75-78)
Appendix C
Function parameters and variability
In this appendix the different functions and their parameters are specified. In the table below
an explanation of the different parameters and the questions answered in terms of variation
is listed.
FRAM function Name of function
Input Here the input the function uses or transforms is listed, this constitute
the links to previous functions
Output Here the output the function produces, this constituting the links to the
subsequent functions is listed
Time Here what affects time availability of the function is listed.
Control Here what supervises or adjusts the function is listed. This can be active
functions or just plans, procedures and guidelines.
Preconditions Here conditions that must be fulfilled before a function can be per-
formed are listed. This can for example be that another step or process
has been completed or that a specific system condition has been estab-
lished.
Resources Here what is needed by the function to process the input is listed, this
can for example be procedures, software, hardware, energy, manpower
etc
Variability In this cell the three questions below are answered
1. Which conditions can lead to increased performance variability?
2. Which functions are affected?
3. How can the variability express itself and how may this affect/be
affected by other functions?
Comment If there is any special circumstances or other information relevant for
the variability this is described here.
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C.1 Function parameters and variability
C.1.1 Foreground functions
FRAM function Prepare for work
Input Marked P&ID
Output System ready for shut down
Time
Control Seal must be the correct one, standard operating procedure (SOP)
Preconditions Work Permit (WP)
Resources Tools, technician
Variability
1. Competence, stress
2. Process shut down will not be initiated if the system is not pre-
pared, or the isolation will be inadequate
3. Wrong tools, no tools, tools not calibrated, operations not per-
formed according to WP, wrong seal
FRAM function Shut down process
Input Coordination with other activities
Output Process shut down
Time
Control SOP
Preconditions System preparation done
Resources Central Control Room (CCR)
Variability
1. Work conditions, degradation, communication
2. Pressure release, draining and isolation
3. Process not shut down, wrong process shut down.
FRAM function Isolate using valves
Input Marked P&IDs, Pressure
Output Closed system
Time
Control SOP
Preconditions Process shutdown
Resources CCR, Area technician
Variability
1. Work conditions, degradation, communication, competence,
stress
2. Draining and isolation
3. Wrong valves closed, valve in wrong position
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FRAM function Drain
Input Work Order (WO), WP, marked P&ID
Output Empty piping and equipment
Time
Control SOP
Preconditions Draining to closed system
Resources Area technician, N2/steam
Variability
1. Competence, stress, communication, degradation, work condi-
tions
2. Isolation
3. Wrong valves opened, inadequate draining, inadequate proce-
dures, no flushing, inadequate gas freeing
FRAM function Isolate
Input WO, Marked P&ID, Pressure
Output System isolated with blindings
Time
Control SOP
Preconditions System drained
Resources CCR, Area technician
Variability
1. Competence, stress, availability of resources
2. Disconnecting equipment
3. Inadequate isolation, wrong flange isolated, isolation not fitted ac-
cording to pressure.
FRAM function Disconnect equipment (valves, electric eq. etc.)
Input Marked P&ID
Output Valves locked/disconnected, electric eq. disconnected
Time
Control SOP
Preconditions Isolated system
Resources Area technician, instrument technician, electro, keys
Variability Inadequate or not locked/disconnected valves/electric equipment
1. Competence, stress, communication, degradation, work condi-
tions
2. Disassembly
3. Wrong equipment disconnected, equipment not disconnected
Comment The process of disconnecting may cause leakages when it is performed,
but this procedure is mostly done to prevent work accidents
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FRAM function Disconnect safety system
Input Coordination with CCR
Output Safety system disconnected
Time No hot work or other activities can be performed simultaneously.
Control Ignition control
Preconditions Must be registered on the WP form or isolation document. Splice log
signed and SAP activated. Safety preparations performed, signed WP,
Location approved
Resources CCR
Variability
1. Work conditions, degradation, communication, competence,
stress
2. Disassembly
3. Safety system not disconnected
FRAM function Disassembly
Input Marked flanges, updated V&B list
Output Pump released from system
Time
Control Supervision of opening by area technician
Preconditions Valves locked/disconnected, electric eq. disconnected
Resources Tools, technician, equipment prepared
Variability
1. Competence, stress, communication, work conditions.
2. *
3. Work done on wrong system, system still contains pressure, work
not done according to WP
Comment *This function is the last performed in the sequence considered in this
analysis and the output is therefore not relevant for any of the functions
considered in this analysis. But this may not be the case if the entire
process is considered.
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C.1.2 Background functions
FRAM function Draw up work description
Input WO, P&ID
Output V&B, AC form, requisition of resources, marked P&IDs
Time
Control QA on plan performed by area manager
Preconditions
Resources Area manager, planner
Variability
1. Stress and workload may affect the variation
2. Isolate, draw up work permit, coordinate with CCR, Isolate using
valves, prepare for work and quality control, drain
3. Wrong notation of blinding/P&ID, seal type, pump pressure mo-
ment, split position etc. Common barriers not marked.
Comment The Work description forms the basis for the entire operation and the
output is used in several parts of the process, also in functions proceed-
ing disassembly, which is not considered in this analysis.
FRAM function Draw up work permit
Input WO, marked P&IDs
Output WP
Time
Control Approval of WP by area manager and platform manager
Preconditions
Resources Planner, Area Manager
Variability
1. Quality of communication, team collaboration quality
2. Quality control, coordinate with CCR, Quality check and sign WP,
Prepare for work, Drain
3. Inadequate work permit
FRAM function Coordinate with CCR
Input Work description, WP
Output Coordination with other activities
Time Dependent on situation, continuous activity competing with other ac-
tivities
Control Experience, knowledge of other situations
Preconditions Other activities known and registered
Resources Area manager CCR
Variability
1. Work conditions, communication, competence, stress, conflicting
goals, available resources
2. Process shut down, disconnect safety system, ignition control
3. Inadequate information/communication, wrong interpretation of
information
Comment Available resources can mean competence caught up in other activi-
ties/operations, necessary tool etc.
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FRAM function Label Equipment
Input Marked P&ID
Output Marked flanges
Time
Control SOP
Preconditions
Resources Area technician
Variability
1. Stress, communication
2. Disassembly
3. Wrong, inadequate or no labeling of blinding/valves/flanges
FRAM function Prepare
Input
Output SJA, Equipment prepared, safety preparations performed
Time
Control Experience, knowledge to perform SJA
Preconditions
Resources Technician CCR, Area technician
Variability
1. Work conditions, communication, competence, stress, conflicting
goals, available resources
2. Disconnecting and disassembly
3. WO form not signed, singed but equipment inadequately pre-
pared. Inadequate or no SJA, safety preparations not performed
according to WP
FRAM function Quality check and sign WP
Input Authorization of WP, Location approved, signed WP, WP activated in SAP
Output
Time
Control
Preconditions
Resources CCR, Area technician, Technician
Variability
1. Work conditions, communication, competence, stress, conflicting
goals, available resources
2. Disconnecting safety system and disassembly
3. Shortcomings not found, inadequate communication
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FRAM function Sign splice log
Input Splice log
Output Updated and signed splice log
Time
Control SOP
Preconditions
Resources CCR
Variability
1. Communication, stress
2. Disconnect safety system
3. Splice log not signed
FRAM function Update V&B
Input Splice log, P&ID
Output Updated and live V&B list
Time Must be updated continuously when changes in status of V&B occur
Control SOP
Preconditions
Resources Area, area technician
Variability
1. Communication, stress
2. Disassembly
3. Changes not updated in the list, the list is not kept in a central
place ensuring access to all people involved
FRAM function Supervision ignition control
Input Coordination with other activities
Output Control of spark and ignition sources
Time
Control
Preconditions Automatic system functioning
Resources Ignition control system, CCR
Variability
1. Degradation of system, availability of resources
2. Disassembly
3. Inadequate ignition control
FRAM function Quality control
Input WP, P&IDs
Output Clearance signal to start Disassembly
Time
Control
Preconditions
Resources Area technician, Technician
Variability
1. Communication, stress, qualifications
2. Disassembly
3. Errors on flange found, Remaining HC in system not found
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Pre-study report
Inger Krohn Halseth
inger.halseth@stud.ntnu.no
30. mai 2012
1 Preface
This report constitutes the prestudy of the master thesis - Modeling process leaks using Functional
Resonance Accident Modeling (FRAM), written at the Norwegian University of Science and Techno-
logy, department of Production and Quality Engineering during the spring of 2012.
The foundation of the master thesis was laid by the work related to the project assignment - Monito-
ring of Major Accident Risks - Leaks and Fires, which was performed as a literature survey.
2 Background
The existing framework for risk analysis was developed about 50 years ago and is mainly based on
the understanding at that time of how accidents happen and the accident models constructed. Later,
several alternative interpretations of particularly major accidents or organizational accidents have
been launched. As of today, these understandings have in common that no accompanying methods
to perform risk assessment have been developed; generally they are limited to accident investigation
and to explain why accidents have happened.
2.1 Main objective
The main objective of this master thesis is to deliver a report that reviews process leaks on offshore
installation using FRAM. The report should have a focus on understanding if this is an alternative
approach, and gaining some experience on the amount of work involved, whether there are different
results compared to conventional methods and if quantification is possible and suitable.
3 Project description
The master thesis should be performed as a project, with focus on proper planning and project ma-
nagement throughout the project period. As well as the final report, reports on progress and noncon-
formance should be produced.
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3.1 Problems to be addressed
The master thesis is divided in five tasks listed below with a short comment of how the work is plan-
ned to be executed and/or challenges.
1. Literature survey – review and summarize relevant literature on FRAM and become familiar with
the assignment.
This task will give a better understanding of the method and is an important foundation for the thesis.
Hollnagels books and papers on applied FRAM will be the main source of information.
2. Establish a model for process leaks, based on FRAM. The model will initially be qualitative, but
the goal is that it shall form the basis for a quantitative model.
This task is the biggest one and will demand the majority of time spent on the master thesis. The
major challenge in this problem is gaining a thorough enough understanding of how leakages occur
to be able to model them.
3. Identify the parameters needed for such a model and assess the availability of the data needed to
quantify the risk.
This task will be done in parallel with task two seeing as this is information that will be provided while
working on problem 2.
4. Assess the model developed and the work performed in terms of:
a) The amount of work, compared to conventional methods of analysis.
b) Determine new possibilities of decision support given by such a model compared with con-
ventional methods of analysis.
c) Determine if quantification is possible given such a model, and if so, the new types of data
required to do so.
This, like task 3, will be done in parallel with task 2.
5. Summarize, conclude and give recommendations for further work
4 Work Scope
The master thesis is done over 20 weeks, how these weeks will be distributed between the tasks,
completion and proofreading is shown in the table below. The activity planning includes start up,
planning the project and writing the pre-study report. Completion consists of writing the preface,
introduction, abstract and conclusion. How the time is distributed between the different activities is
shown in the table below.
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Figur 1: Distribution of resoruces
4.1 Mile stones
Seeing as task 3 - 5 will be written as a biproduct of task two, they are not assigned a given finish date.
The following milestones are thus established:
06.02.12 Hand inn of pre-study report
30.03.12 Hand inn of progress report
17.02.12 Task 1 completed
18.05.12 Task 2 completed
01.06.12 Done producing text
11.06.12 Hand in
3
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Progress report
Inger Krohn Halseth
inger.halseth@stud.ntnu.no
May 30, 2012
Progress
The work that has been done has not yet deviated from scheduled plan as presented in the pre-study
report. Some changes have however been made to the plan, as seen in figure 1.
Figure 1: Changes in the progress plan
The work on the literature study has gone according to plan, but the time used to understand and
break down the process considered has been more time consuming than first anticipated. Task 2
is the most time consuming task in the thesis, as reflected in the project plan. The extra time used
to understand and breakdown the process is not reflected in the project plan because this is only a
small part of task 2. To make up for this time there will be made no changes in the project plan, but
the remaining time on task 2 must be spent more efficiently to make up for this.
The finishing time of task 2 is reduced, this change does not mean that less time will be spent on task
2, but is made to reduce the amount of multitasking, seeing as the need to finish this and focus on
the following tasks is pressing. Task 3-5 all depend on task 2, and it is therefore important that this
task does not change much when the consequent tasks are started. By moving the deadline for task
2, time used working on several tasks at once is reduced, and focus can be made on one task at the
time.
Mile stones
The only change in the revised milestones is that the milestone concerning the finishing of task two
moved two weeks back.
06.02.12 Hand inn of pre-study report
30.03.12 Hand inn of progress report
17.02.12 Task 1 completed
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07.05.12 Task 2 completed
01.06.12 Done producing text
11.06.12 Hand in
2
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